---
title: "How to Write a Statement of Applicability (With a Worked Example)"
canonical: "https://auditbadger.com/blog/how-to-write-a-statement-of-applicability-with-a-worked-example/"
last-updated: "2026-07-21"
---

# How to Write a Statement of Applicability (With a Worked Example)

By Maciej • Published 2026-07-22 • 5 min read • Categories: ISO, Compliance Governance, Risk Management

Created with AI assistance. AuditBadger retains editorial control and responsibility.

**TL;DR:** The Statement of Applicability is the index of your entire ISMS: one row per Annex A control, with your decision and your reasoning. Clause 6.1.3(d) requires exactly four things — the necessary controls, justification for their inclusion, whether they are implemented, and justification for excluding any Annex A control. Everything else in your SoA is optional structure. The document is produced by the risk treatment process, not the other way around: you determine the controls your risks require, then compare against Annex A&#39;s 93 controls to verify nothing necessary was overlooked. A good SoA traces every inclusion to specific risks, contracts, or legal requirements, states implementation status honestly (a &quot;partially implemented&quot; with a plan is more credible than 93 rows of &quot;implemented&quot;), and justifies exclusions by the absence of the underlying asset or risk — &quot;no offices, physical controls inherited from our cloud provider and assessed under A.5.23&quot; survives an audit; &quot;not applicable because we&#39;re small&quot; does not. Version it, date it, have it approved, and update it whenever the risk assessment moves — your certificate will reference the SoA version by name, and auditors compare its date against your risk assessment&#39;s to check the trace is alive.

Every document in your ISMS gets skimmed. The Statement of Applicability gets _read_. Certification auditors open it before stage 1, structure their audit plan around it, and your certificate will reference its version number by name. It&#39;s the index of your entire security program: one row per control, with your decision and your reasoning — which makes it a strange document to leave until the week before the audit, which is when most first-timers write it.

This post covers what ISO 27001 actually requires the SoA to contain, a column structure that holds up, and a worked example — including the part most guides dodge: what a defensible exclusion looks like.

## What clause 6.1.3 actually requires

The SoA is an output of risk treatment, not a standalone deliverable. The sequence in [clause 6.1.3](/blog/iso-27001-clause-6-planning-risk-treatment-and-the-statement-of-applicability/) matters: you choose treatment options for each risk, determine the controls those treatments need, and only then compare your control set against [Annex A](/blog/iso-27001-annex-a-controls-the-complete-2022-guide/) — in the standard&#39;s words, to verify that no necessary controls have been overlooked. Annex A is a completeness checklist, not a menu of mandates.

Clause 6.1.3(d) then requires the Statement of Applicability to contain exactly four things:

1. The **necessary controls** — those your risk treatment determined you need, wherever they come from;
2. **Justification for their inclusion** ;
3. Whether they are **implemented or not** ;
4. **Justification for excluding** any of the Annex A controls.

That&#39;s the whole legal minimum. Every other column in your SoA is optional structure — worth having only if it makes the document more useful to you and faster for the auditor.

## The columns that earn their place

| Column | Why it&#39;s there |
| --- | --- |
| Control ID and name (2022 numbering) | One row per Annex A control, plus rows for any controls from other sources (contractual, legal, sector-specific) |
| Applicable? (yes / no) | The decision itself |
| Justification | The trace: which risks, contracts, or legal requirements make this control necessary — or why it genuinely doesn&#39;t apply |
| Implementation status | Implemented / partially implemented / planned — honestly |
| How it&#39;s implemented | Pointer to the policy, procedure, or system that embodies the control |
| Owner | Who answers for it in the audit interview |
| Last reviewed | Proof the document is alive |

The justification column is where SoAs are won and lost. &quot;Risk R-07, customer DPA §4&quot; is a trace an auditor can follow. &quot;Security best practice&quot; copy-pasted down forty rows is a trace to nowhere, and it reads as exactly what it is.

## A worked example: five rows

Here&#39;s what those columns look like filled in for a fictional 25-person, fully remote SaaS company running on AWS:

| Control | Applicable? | Justification | Status | How implemented |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| A.5.7 Threat intelligence | Yes | Risk R-08 (credential-stuffing and novel attacks against customer-facing auth) | Partially implemented | Subscribed to vendor and CERT advisories; triage process being formalized, target Q3 |
| A.5.9 Inventory of information and other associated assets | Yes | Risks R-03 (shadow SaaS), R-11 (unreturned devices); customer contractual requirement | Implemented | Asset Management Procedure v2; [register](/blog/iso-27001-asset-inventory-a-5-9-a-5-11-an-asset-register-that-survives-audits/) generated from MDM, IdP and AWS, curated quarterly |
| A.6.7 Remote working | Yes | Entire workforce is remote; risks R-05 (home network exposure), R-12 (shoulder surfing in public spaces) | Implemented | Remote Working Policy v3; MDM-enforced disk encryption and screen lock |
| A.8.28 Secure coding | Yes | Risk R-02 (vulnerabilities introduced in product code); new-in-2022 control | Implemented | [Secure Coding Standard](/blog/secure-development-controls-in-iso-27001-a-8-25-a-8-28-explained/) v1; enforced via CI checks and mandatory review |
| A.7.4 Physical security monitoring | **No** | No offices or self-managed facilities exist. All production workloads run in AWS; physical premises controls are inherited from the provider and assessed under A.5.23 and the vendor review process (provider attestation reports on file). Home-working risks are treated under A.6.7 and A.8.1. | — | — |

Look at what the exclusion does: it traces to the _absence of the underlying asset_ (no premises), names where the residual risk went (the cloud provider, assessed under a different control), and points at evidence (the provider&#39;s attestation reports). Compare the version auditors see constantly — &quot;Not applicable, we are a small company&quot; — which doesn&#39;t justify anything; it announces that nobody assessed it. Company size is never a justification. The absence of the asset or risk is.

Note also the honest &quot;partially implemented.&quot; At the audit, status claims get tested against evidence — 93 rows of &quot;implemented&quot; followed by a stage 2 that says otherwise is a much worse position than a visible, dated plan for the gaps.

## Approval, versioning, and keeping it alive

The SoA is documented information under clause 7.5: it needs a version, a date, and an approver. Then it needs to stay synchronized with the risk assessment that justifies it. Update it when the risk assessment changes — which [clause 8.2](/blog/iso-27001-clause-8-operation-where-your-controls-actually-run/) requires at planned intervals and at significant changes — and when new systems, vendors, or incidents shift what &quot;necessary&quot; means.

Two facts worth knowing before your first audit. Your certificate will typically cite the SoA version and date it covers — this is a named, versioned artifact, not an internal working file. And auditors routinely compare the SoA&#39;s date against the risk assessment&#39;s: an SoA older than the current risk assessment means the trace between them is broken, and that&#39;s a finding about the system, not the paperwork.

## The findings auditors keep raising

- **No trace to the risk assessment.** Justifications that never reference a risk, so the SoA floats free of the process that&#39;s supposed to produce it.
- **Lazy exclusions.** Missing justifications, or boilerplate (&quot;not relevant to our business&quot;) that shows the control was never actually considered.
- **Status inflation.** Everything marked implemented; evidence at stage 2 disagrees.
- **Identical justifications.** The same sentence on forty rows — a sure sign the column was filled, not thought.
- **The frozen SoA.** Version 1.0, dated the month of certification, unchanged through two surveillance audits while the company shipped a new product line.

The pattern behind all five is the same: the SoA is supposed to be the visible surface of a working risk process, and auditors read it precisely to check that the process underneath exists. Write it as the output of your [Clause 6 machinery](/blog/iso-27001-clause-6-planning-risk-treatment-and-the-statement-of-applicability/) and it stays defensible by construction. Write it as a standalone spreadsheet the week before the audit, and it becomes the document most likely to unravel the whole [management system](/blog/iso-27001-clauses-4-10-the-requirements-behind-the-controls/) in front of the one reader guaranteed to notice.


## Frequently asked questions

### What must an ISO 27001 Statement of Applicability contain?

Clause 6.1.3(d) requires exactly four things: the necessary controls (determined by your risk treatment, from Annex A or any other source), justification for their inclusion, whether each is implemented or not, and justification for excluding any Annex A control. Everything else — owners, evidence pointers, review dates — is optional structure that makes the document more useful but isn&#39;t formally required.

### Can you exclude Annex A controls from the Statement of Applicability?

Yes — Annex A is a completeness checklist, not a list of mandates, and exclusions are legitimate when justified. A defensible justification traces to the absence of the underlying asset or risk: a fully remote company with no premises can exclude physical security monitoring (A.7.4) by showing provider-inherited physical controls assessed under A.5.23. Company size or effort is never a valid justification — &quot;not applicable because we&#39;re small&quot; reads as &quot;we didn&#39;t assess it,&quot; and auditors treat it accordingly.

### Does the Statement of Applicability need to list all 93 Annex A controls?

Effectively yes. Because 6.1.3 requires you to justify the exclusion of any Annex A control, the only practical way to demonstrate every control was considered is one row per control with an explicit applicable/not-applicable decision. The SoA should also include necessary controls that don&#39;t come from Annex A — for example, ones driven by contracts, laws, or sector requirements.

### How often should the Statement of Applicability be updated?

Whenever the risk assessment it&#39;s built on changes — which Clause 8.2 requires at planned intervals and at significant changes — and when new systems, vendors, or incidents shift which controls are necessary. Auditors compare the SoA&#39;s date against the risk assessment&#39;s date to check the trace between them is alive. Note that your certificate typically references the SoA version and date it covers, so it&#39;s a formally versioned, approved document, not an internal working file.

### What is the difference between the Statement of Applicability and the risk treatment plan?

The SoA is the index: which controls are applicable, why, and their implementation status — one row per control. The risk treatment plan is the execution document: how each treatment will be implemented, by whom, and by when, and it must be approved by the risk owners, who also formally accept the residual risk. They&#39;re linked outputs of the same Clause 6.1.3 process, but auditors expect them as distinct artifacts.

