ISO 27001 Clause 6: Planning, Risk Treatment, and the Statement of Applicability
Clause 6 of ISO 27001:2022 is the decision engine of the ISMS. 6.1.2 requires a defined risk assessment process with risk acceptance criteria, producing consistent, valid and comparable results — identify risks, assign owners, analyze likelihood and impact, evaluate against your criteria. 6.1.3 requires you to choose treatment options, determine the controls you need, and compare them against Annex A to verify nothing necessary was overlooked — producing the Statement of Applicability, which must justify every inclusion AND every exclusion, plus a risk treatment plan approved by risk owners who also accept the residual risk. 6.2 requires measurable, monitored, communicated information security objectives. 6.3 — new in the 2022 revision — requires changes to the ISMS to be carried out in a planned manner. The audit reality: the SoA is the most-read document in your entire ISMS, and the most common Clause 6 findings are risks without owners, an SoA that doesn't trace back to the risk assessment, exclusions with lazy justifications, and residual risk nobody formally accepted.
If Clause 4 defines your world and Clause 5 commits your leadership, Clause 6 is where the ISMS actually decides things: which risks matter, what you'll do about them, and — through the Statement of Applicability — why each of Annex A's 93 controls does or doesn't apply to you. It's the intellectual core of the standard, and the part auditors read most closely. This is part three of our clauses 4–10 series (hub here, Clause 5 before it).
6.1.1 — Risks and opportunities, generally
The clause opens by requiring you to consider the issues from Clause 4.1 and the requirements from 4.2 and determine the risks and opportunities that need to be addressed — so the ISMS achieves its outcomes, prevents or reduces undesired effects, and improves continually. This is the traceability hinge of the whole standard: your context analysis is supposed to feed your risk work. When an auditor finds a context document and a risk register that share no vocabulary, both start looking decorative.
6.1.2 — Information security risk assessment
What it requires: define and apply a risk assessment process that:
- establishes risk acceptance criteria and criteria for when assessments are performed;
- produces consistent, valid and comparable results — the phrase that outlaws vibes-based scoring that changes with whoever ran the workshop;
- identifies risks to confidentiality, integrity and availability of information within the ISMS scope, and identifies risk owners;
- analyzes them — potential consequences, realistic likelihood, resulting level of risk;
- evaluates them — compare against your criteria and prioritize for treatment.
Notably absent from the 2022 standard: any required methodology. Asset-based, scenario-based, a 3×3 matrix or a 5×5 — all fine, as long as the process is documented, criteria exist before scoring starts, and two people running it would land in roughly the same place. If you're building your first register, our startup risk assessment guide covers the practical mechanics.
Evidence in practice: the documented method and criteria, the risk register itself (with named owners — "the company" is not an owner), and results of the assessment being run at planned intervals or after significant change, not once at certification and never again.
6.1.3 — Risk treatment and the Statement of Applicability
What it requires: define and apply a risk treatment process that selects treatment options (modify, retain, avoid, share), determines all controls necessary to implement those options, and then — the standard's most misunderstood step — compares your determined controls with Annex A to verify no necessary control has been overlooked.
Read that order again: you derive controls from your risks first, and Annex A is the checklist you verify against, not the menu you start from. In practice everyone works both directions at once, and that's fine — but the audit story must run risk → control, because that's what the standard says the SoA documents.
The outputs 6.1.3 demands:
- The Statement of Applicability (SoA) — for each Annex A control: is it applicable, justification for inclusion, justification for exclusion, and implementation status. Justifying exclusions is where credibility is won or lost; "not applicable" with no reasoning is a finding waiting to happen, while "A.7.14 excluded — no physical media leaves the cloud provider's custody, see risk R-12" survives scrutiny. (Control-by-control detail lives in our Annex A guide; for software teams, the secure development cluster is the hardest set to exclude.)
- The risk treatment plan — which treatments, who owns them, by when.
- Risk owners' approval of the plan and their acceptance of residual risk — a formal step teams routinely skip. Someone with a name has to say "yes, what remains after treatment is acceptable to me," and there must be a record of them saying it.
The SoA deserves respect for one practical reason: it's the single most-read document in your ISMS. Your certification auditor plans the whole audit from it, and increasingly, enterprise customers ask for it alongside your certificate.
6.2 — Information security objectives
What it requires: establish security objectives at relevant functions and levels. They must be consistent with the policy, measurable if practicable, take into account applicable requirements and the results of risk assessment and treatment, be monitored (an explicit 2022 addition), communicated, updated as appropriate, and available as documented information — with plans that define what will be done, resources, responsibility, deadline, and how results are evaluated.
Good startup-scale objectives look like: "100% of production access behind SSO and MFA by Q3," "median critical-vulnerability remediation under 14 days," "restore test of primary database passes within RTO twice this year." Bad ones look like "improve security posture" — unmeasurable, unownable, and a reliable audit observation.
6.3 — Planning of changes (new in 2022)
What it requires: when the organization determines the need for changes to the ISMS, the changes shall be carried out in a planned manner. That's the entire clause — one sentence, added in the 2022 revision.
It sounds vacuous and isn't: it gives the auditor a hook to ask how last year's changes happened. New scope, new risk methodology, replaced ISMS owner, major architecture shift — was each considered, decided, and documented somewhere (management review minutes count), or did the ISMS just mutate? A short "ISMS changes" log, or a standing agenda item in management review, satisfies it cheaply.
Common Clause 6 nonconformities
- Risks without owners, or owners who left the company — 6.1.2 names risk ownership explicitly.
- An SoA disconnected from the risk assessment. Controls marked applicable "because the template said so," with no risk that motivates them — breaking the 6.1.3 chain.
- Lazy exclusion justifications. "N/A" is not a justification; auditors probe exclusions before inclusions.
- No recorded residual-risk acceptance. Treatment plans exist, but nobody formally accepted what remains.
- Objectives nobody monitors. Written for certification, never measured since — the 2022 "shall be monitored" wording made this an easy finding.
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The bottom line
Clause 6 is where auditors separate an ISMS that thinks from one that copies templates. Keep the chain intact — context feeds risks, risks have owners, treatments trace to controls, the SoA justifies every yes and every no, and someone accountable accepts what's left over. Do that and the rest of the audit becomes verification rather than archaeology. Next in the series: Clause 7, Support — resources, competence, awareness, and the documented-information rules that decide whether your evidence counts.
Frequently asked questions
What is the Statement of Applicability in ISO 27001? +
The Statement of Applicability (SoA) is the document required by Clause 6.1.3 that lists every Annex A control and states whether it applies to your organization — with a justification for each inclusion, a justification for each exclusion, and the control's implementation status. It's produced by your risk treatment process: you determine the controls your risks require, then compare against Annex A to verify nothing necessary was overlooked. The SoA is arguably the most-read document in your entire ISMS — your certification auditor plans the audit from it, and enterprise customers increasingly request it alongside your certificate. The credibility test is the exclusions: "not applicable" with no reasoning invites findings, while an exclusion tied to a specific risk-register entry survives scrutiny.
Does ISO 27001 require a specific risk assessment methodology? +
No. ISO 27001:2022 deliberately doesn't mandate a methodology — asset-based, scenario-based, a 3×3 or 5×5 matrix are all acceptable. What Clause 6.1.2 does require: a defined and documented process with risk acceptance criteria and criteria for when assessments are performed, established before scoring starts; results that are consistent, valid, and comparable (two people running the process should land in roughly the same place); identification of risks to confidentiality, integrity, and availability within the ISMS scope; a named risk owner for each risk; and analysis of consequences and realistic likelihood, evaluated against your criteria. Auditors don't grade the sophistication of your method — they check that it's defined, applied consistently, and rerun at planned intervals rather than once at certification.
What is new in Clause 6 of ISO 27001:2022? +
Two changes matter. First, an entirely new subclause: 6.3, "Planning of changes," requires that when the organization determines the need for changes to the ISMS, they're carried out in a planned manner — one sentence that gives auditors a hook to ask how last year's ISMS changes (new scope, new methodology, replaced ISMS owner) were considered and documented. A short changes log or a standing management review agenda item satisfies it. Second, Clause 6.2 on information security objectives now explicitly requires objectives to be monitored and to be available as documented information — making "objectives written for certification and never measured since" an easy finding. The risk assessment and treatment requirements in 6.1 are substantively unchanged from 2013.